In Conversation with T.V. Paul

In Conversation with T.V. Paul McGill University

| Skip to search Skip to navigation Skip to page content

User Tools (skip):

Sign in | Wednesday, November 14, 2018
Sister Sites: McGill website | myMcGill

McGill News
ALUMNI QUARTERLY - winter 2008
McGill News cover

| Help
Page Options (skip): Larger
Home > McGill News > 2002 > Summer 2002 > In Conversation with T.V. Paul

In Conversation with T.V. Paul

In conversation with T.V. Paul

Political science professor T.V. Paul writes and teaches about war, nuclear proliferation, and the global balance of power. He is director of the Université de Montréal-McGill University Research Group in Internation-al Security (REGIS). His recent book, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, was selected by Choice magazine as one of its "Outstanding Academic Titles" for 2001 and he is currently working on another, entitled War-Making and State-Making in South Asia.

Is the threat of a nuclear attack greater today than during the Cold War?

It's a different kind of threat. During the Cold War, there was a fear of global nuclear war. Now, the fear is of terrorists gaining nuclear weapons and striking, or of regional nuclear war. The climate between India and Pakistan is very hot right now, but at the major power level the threat has been reduced. Today, Russia, China and the U.S. are not in a situation, as in the Cold War, in which there is intense rivalry that could heat up into war.

What about the possibility of an accidental nuclear war?

That possibility exists, at a minimal level, although we don't know how well Russian nuclear weapons are protected or maintained. But the threat of an inadvertent nuclear war was much more real during the Cold War.

The U.S. and former Soviet Union instituted safeguards to prevent accidents. Do new nuclear powers have the same safeguards?

The conflict between Pakistan and India in Kashmir is creating a lot of instability in the region, and the safeguards the superpowers have are missing in that context. The proximity of the two countries and the intense conflict dynamics are cause for concern. But it's very hard, even there, to see nuclear war erupting. A conventional war would be more likely.

Have they instituted any safeguards?

India has instituted a "no first use" pledge -- a moral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. I don't know about Pakistan. One safeguard is that nuclear weapons on both sides are not "mated" -- the components are kept separately for technical reasons. If there were sufficient provocation for a nuclear strike, it would be a matter of hours before the missiles were ready to go. This is a major safeguard compared to long-time nuclear states, in which the missiles are ready.

Is mutually assured destruction still enough of a deterrent?

Even under intense pressure, nuclear war is not something most decision makers would initiate. If Pakistan attacked India with a nuclear weapon, India would respond in such a way that Pakistan would not exist as a state. Pakistan has a reason to make that threat, but it is clearly not a credible one. A problem is that Pakistan is the only country in which the military controls the nuclear weapons. Normally, civilian leaders have the button.

Does that increase the threat?

The military is often the most offensively oriented in its approach -- shoot first, ask questions later. On the other hand, the first atomic bomb was dropped by a civilian president, Harry Truman. And most wars in history have been initiated by civilian leaders. It would be a bigger threat if the military lost control of the nukes, maybe to the Jihadi, but I would say that is unlikely.

Could a group such as Al Qaeda acquire a nuclear weapon?

Even if they acquired one, it may not be so easy to use. They would need certain technical skills and delivery systems to have the maximum effect. The idea is not totally farfetched, but for the foreseeable future it's a slim possibility. Even many countries have failed to develop these weapons, so it would not be easy for a terrorist group. However, there are techniques by which they could create radiation effects. They could also use an aircraft instead of a missile, or another vehicle like a car. Without the effect of altitude, however, that would limit the destruction. A nuke in a car could destroy a certain area, but conventional explosives would probably have the same effect.

After the Cold War, there were stories that corrupt officials from the former Soviet Union were selling nuclear weapons and materials. Were those fears justified?

Some of it was exaggerated, some of it was not. Actually, the U.S. had a program to buy some of the materials and draw Soviet nuclear physicists to the U.S., and that succeeded quite well. But we know that Soviet nuclear materials, including uranium and plutonium, are missing. In Eastern Europe and some Soviet republics, the mafia and other criminal groups want to sell it. But there is no real indication that this material will be used to make weapons in future conflicts.

Is there security in place now to protect the Soviet nuclear stockpile?

Questions have been raised about that, and the U.S. is heavily involved in that process. The biggest fear would be if the Russian state collapsed, but that possibility is decreasing. In the initial years after the Cold War, the Russian military was in great disarray, but that situation has improved because Russia's economy is doing slightly better.

Has the U.S. war on terrorism changed the nuclear equation?

The U.S. has changed its nuclear posture. It just recently produced a nuclear posture review, which suggests that the U.S. could attack those states that have nuclear weapons if there is an imminent nuclear attack on the U.S. or its forces abroad. It also says that the U.S. may use them to prevent an attack with chemical or biological weapons.

Do you think that's a bluff?

It is quite a bluff, but it has a deterrent value. For instance, if the U.S. and Iraq get into a conflict, and Iraq threatens the use of chemical weapons against U.S. troops, it could be an effective deterrent. The other factor is the development of miniature nuclear weapons. "Mini nukes" could be used for bunker busting or destroying caves, targeting Sadaam Hussein's bunker, for example. That would be a small attack, but still a setback to the nuclear taboo. Even with mini nukes, the U.S. would be constrained, because once you use them, the taboo is broken, and it would be very hard to tell someone else not to.

So they don't want to use them, but it's not unthinkable anymore?

I think they want to keep this uncertainty as a deterrent to rogue elements or any state that might be tempted to test them. However, I don't believe the threat works with terrorists. States can be deterred, but terrorists don't mind nuclear war because it will bring more attention to their point of view.

Why do countries choose not to develop nuclear weapons if they have the capability?

If you are not a major power, you try to maximize your security through means other than acquiring weapons which will generate hostility from your neighbours, who might then try to acquire them also. You don't want nuclear weapons unless you are really in a bad neighbourhood, or you have major power ambitions.

Canada, Australia and Sweden are examples of countries that chose not to acquire them. Brazil and Argentina tried for a period of time but gave up the option, partly because they don't want to spread this weapon more. A nuclear weapon might not give you more security; it might actually give you less if your opponent gets it too.

Would a "star wars" missile defence system protect North America from nuclear attack?

It could protect some weapons systems, and it could protect against limited strikes, such as from terrorist groups or from nations like North Korea, but it is highly unlikely that you could ever get a foolproof system. Some key population centres could be protected, but if there was a massive strike, it's likely some missiles would get through.

Another benefit is a certain amount of political leverage, by making it more difficult to engage in an attack on the U.S. They are trying to move away from the mutually assured destruction idea, and if they succeed, the U.S. will increase its power in the international system. Right now, the only leverage Russia has over America is its nuclear capability; if that is weakened, U.S. power and position will increase.

How else can we defend ourselves?

Security may very much depend on preventing small-scale attacks with good investigation and intelligence about terrorist groups. The ability of cities to evacuate is also critical, as is protecting communication networks. The whole world could be in trouble if communication systems are attacked.

Another threat to industrial states is the uncertainty itself. We hear almost every day about the possibility of an attack; unless people can forget about it and move on with their lives, this could affect the economy.

Is an arms deal between the U.S. and Russia still important?

It would reduce the missiles stockpiled on each side from 6,000 to 2,000 or less. But both countries will keep a certain number of those weapons in storage. Russia in particular is worried about losing that deterrent because in recent years, the country's position has weakened.

At the same time, because of 9/11, Russia is willing to cooperate with the U.S., since they face the threat of terrorism in Chechnya and other places. The war on terrorism has given Russia a chance to get closer to the U.S., and in exchange, the U.S. doesn't say a word about what Russia does in Chechnya.

Does that make an arms deal more likely?

The U.S. wants an arms deal because the time for big nuclear arsenals is over. China, for example, only has about 25 missiles. The U.S. and Russia want to bury the Cold War and move on, and the U.S. wants to gain more dominance in the world, so it has to reduce Russian missiles. For Russia, maintaining a battle-ready nuclear arsenal is expensive and they could be using that money for regular armed forces, the ones fighting the guerrillas in Chechnya. I think there is incentive on both sides to come to an agreement, and that would be a good step.

Professor Paul was interviewed by Montreal writer Sylvain Comeau.

view sidebar content | back to top of page

Search